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THE “UNWELCOME OBLIGATION”: WHY
NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL COURTS
SHOULD DRAW DISTRICT LINES
Sara N. Nordstrand*
In recent years, the judiciary’s inability to hold state legislatures
accountable for partisan gerrymanders has encouraged state governments to
draw legislative and congressional district lines with high partisan
advantage, thereby allowing a political party to acquire seats in numbers
disproportionate to their popular support. In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari on two partisan gerrymandering cases: Gill v. Whitford
and Benisek v. Lamone. Although the Court might articulate a judicially
manageable standard to determine when a districting plan is politically fair,
other methods to prevent federal courts from creating district maps that
perpetuate partisan bias exist.
This Note examines and critiques current debates regarding the
judiciary’s role in redistricting and adjudicating partisan gerrymandering
claims. It argues that independent redistricting commissions—enacted
through state voter initiatives or referendums—should replace federal
courts’ authority to develop redistricting plans.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 2011, for the first time in forty years, Republicans passed a
redistricting plan, Act 43, through Wisconsin’s state legislature.1
Wisconsin’s recent state assembly elections illustrate the plan’s partisan
effects. In 2012, Republicans won sixty of the ninety-nine state assembly
seats with over 48 percent of the popular vote.2 In the 2014 and 2016
elections, Republicans maintained control: in 2014, the party won sixty-three
seats with 52 percent of the vote,3 and in 2016, Republicans won sixty-four
seats with 53 percent of the vote.4
“Partisan bias in congressional district maps following the 2010 census
tripled compared to the post-2000 districts.”5 Eighteen states have significant
1. 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 708. Following the 2010 census, Republicans controlled both
houses of the state legislature and the governorship. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837,
846 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161). In Wisconsin,
the legislature drafts state senate and assembly districts following each decennial census. WIS.
CONST. art. IV, § 3. Under the U.S. Constitution, states have the primary responsibility to
reapportion their federal and state legislative districts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993). In the majority of states, the state legislature draws
the legislative district maps that are passed by a majority vote from each chamber of the state’s
legislature and must withstand the governor’s veto power. ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET AL.,
GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA 3 (2016).
2. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853; see also Emily Bazelon, The New Front in the
Gerrymandering Wars: Democracy vs. Math, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/magazine/the-new-front-in-the-gerrymandering-warsdemocracy-vs-math.html [https://perma.cc/UZ2N-JYQE].
3. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853.
4. Bazelon, supra note 2.
5. Anthony J. McGann et al., We Have a Standard for Judging Partisan
Gerrymandering. The Supreme Court Should Use It., WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/02/we-have-a-standardfor-judging-partisan-gerrymandering-the-supreme-court-should-use-it/
[https://perma.cc/32DE-BNL7]. The majority of studies found little or no partisan bias,
defined as deviation from partisan symmetry, from the 1980s until the 2000s, at which time
there was a slight bias toward the Republican Party (1.5 percent). MCGANN ET AL., supra note
1, at 17; see also Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral
Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 514, 536 (1994) (defining partisan
symmetry as the ability of each party to translate the same percentage of district vote into

2018]

THE “UNWELCOME OBLIGATION”

1999

partisan bias, such as a 20 percent Republican advantage when Democrats
and Republicans obtain equal votes.6 Partisan gains allow a political party to
acquire seats in numbers disproportionate to the party’s popular support.
Indeed, “estimates suggest that gerrymandering before the 2012 elections
cost Democrats between 20 and 41 seats in the House.”7
This Note examines the extent of federal courts’ involvement in
redistricting and the ways in which the judiciary can limit partisan
gerrymandering—drawing district lines to entrench the political party in
power.8 Part I provides an overview of redistricting and reapportionment.
Part I.A discusses legislative districting: the constitutional and statutory
standards for reapportionment and what constitutes a partisan gerrymander.
Part I.B analyzes the rules authorizing courts’ involvement in redistricting:
when the state and federal judiciary may redraw district plans and when
federal courts can adjudicate redistricting claims.
Part II explores current debates regarding the judiciary’s role in
redistricting and adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims. Parts II.A and
II.B analyze opposing positions: complete judicial removal and complete
judicial involvement. Parts II.A.3 and II.B.3 discuss the ramifications of each
approach on outstanding state and federal redistricting litigation. Part II.C
analyzes the flaws of each approach and suggests that the federal judiciary
create independent solutions for drawing electoral districts and adjudicating
redistricting claims.
Finally, Part III proposes a resolution that confines judicial intervention to
adjudicating constitutional apportionment and Voting Rights Act (VRA)
challenges. This Note argues that independent redistricting commissions
should replace federal courts’ authority to reapportion districts if a state
legislature fails to adopt a constitutional plan before the state’s redistricting
deadline. Direct legislation—state voter initiatives or referendums—can
limit the conflict of interest present in legislative redistricting, such as
representatives drawing the districts in which they will campaign.
legislative seats). In 2012, Republicans won 234 out of 435 seats in the House of
Representatives with 49.4 percent of the vote. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
6. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4 (finding that thirty-eight states have three or more
House of Representatives districts, which is the number of districts in which partisan bias can
occur). As of August 2017, redistricting litigation was ongoing in seven states, including three
appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court. Michael Li et al., The State of Redistricting Litigation
(Late January 2018 Edition), BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/state-redistricting-litigation
[https://perma.cc/L228VN6E].
7. Bernard Grofman, The Supreme Court Will Examine Partisan Gerrymandering in
2017.
That Could Change the Voting Map., WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/31/the-supreme-courtwill-examine-partisan-gerrymandering-in-2017-that-could-change-the-voting-map
[https://perma.cc/T36U-VBGR]; see also Jeff Greenfield, The Democrats’ Gerrymandering
Obsession, Politico (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/
10/06/supreme-court-gerrymandering-democrats-obsession-215686
[https://perma.cc/XA7W-WQK4] (stating “Republicans enjoy [a net of] 16 to 17 extra seats
in Congress under the maps of [2010] because of partisan bias” (first alteration in original)).
8. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658
(2015) (5–4 decision).
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I. AT THE DRAWINGBOARD: RULES REGARDING
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Legislative Districting
This Part discusses how each state’s legislature or supreme court, or
federal district courts, reapportion federal congressional and state legislative
districts in response to each decennial census. Part I.A.1 discusses the
constitutional and statutory criteria that govern legislative districting. Part
I.A.2 then analyzes how state legislatures create partisan gerrymanders.
1. Constitutional and Statutory Standards
The Constitution requires that Congress conduct a decennial national
census to determine the population of the United States.9 In turn, Congress
reapportions the number of representatives each state sends to the House of
Representatives.10 After reapportionment, state legislatures must redraw
district lines to maintain districts of equal populations to satisfy the
Fourteenth Amendment’s “one person, one vote” requirement.11
Legislative districting consists of both federal congressional and state
legislative districts.12 Although Article I of the Constitution regulates
congressional districts and the Equal Protection Clause governs state
districts, courts review both under the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The Equal
Protection Clause requires that states “make an honest and good faith effort
to construct [legislative] districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is
practicable.”14 In Reynolds v. Sims,15 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the

9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
10. See Timothy P. Brennan, Note, Cleaning Out the Augean Stables: Pennsylvania’s
Most Recent Redistricting and a Call to Clean Up This Messy Process, 13 WIDENER L.J. 235,
238 (2003).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. Although frequently
used interchangeably, districting and redistricting refer to the process of drawing electoral
district lines from which voters elect public officials, while apportionment and
reapportionment are the “allocation of a finite number of representatives among a fixed
number of pre-established areas.” Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 161 n.1 (1986) (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
12. Redistricting also affects local jurisdictions, such as county commissions, city
councils, and school boards. ACLU, EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT
REDISTRICTING
BUT
WERE
AFRAID
TO
ASK
3–4
(2001),
https://www.aclu.org/report/everything-you-always-wanted-know-about-redistricting-wereafraid-ask [https://perma.cc/Y2RA-VXW5]. This Note focuses only on federal congressional
and state legislative districts.
13. Brennan, supra note 10, at 244 n.39, 257–58.
14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964); see also Harris v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306–07 (2016); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18
(1964) (construing Article I, § 2 of the Constitution to embody the “one person, one vote”
principle for congressional districts). In Harris, the Court held that attacks on state-approved
plans with a maximum population deviation under 10 percent will rarely succeed. Harris, 136
S. Ct. at 1306–07.
15. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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failure to redistrict decennially is “constitutionally suspect.”16 However,
states may constitutionally redistrict mid-decade.17
Traditional considerations that permit deviation from equally populated
districts include, but are not limited to, “compactness, contiguity [of
territory], and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by
actual shared interests.”18 The Supreme Court recently recognized the
“competitive balance among political parties” and “compliance with section
five of the [VRA]” as legitimate considerations that permit deviation from
equipopulated districts.19 State constitutions, elections codes, and statutes
list additional districting criteria.20 Delaware forbids its General Assembly
from creating districts that unduly advantage a person or political party.21
However, states including Maryland require that the legislature respect
existing political boundaries when redistricting.22 State legislatures also
consider the federal VRA, specifically section 2, which prohibits legislatures
from creating districts that intentionally or effectively dilute minority voters’
ability to elect candidates of their choice.23 Although the Constitution
authorizes Congress to “make or alter such [state] Regulations,”24 Congress
has never directly intervened in the districting process.25
2. Partisan Gerrymanders
Besides adhering to constitutional and statutory criteria, state legislatures
may draw districts with political implications. “The very essence of
districting is to produce a different—a more ‘politically fair’—result than
would be reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would
take 100% of the legislative seats. Politics and political considerations are

16. Id. at 584. However, the Court did not hold that decennial reapportionment is a
constitutional requirement. Id. at 583. Subsequent cases assume that the release of decennial
data invalidates existing districting plans if the data indicates a shift in population. See, e.g.,
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 488 n.2 (2003) (collecting cases).
17. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006) (5–
4 decision).
18. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); see also Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 534 (E.D. Va. 2015). Contiguity, compactness, and
population equality are statutory requirements. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (2012) (codifying singlemember house districts); Brennan, supra note 10, at 244–45.
19. Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1306–07. The VRA protects the rights guaranteed by the
Fifteenth Amendment by “provid[ing] minority voters an opportunity to participate in the
electoral process and elect candidates of their choice, generally free of discrimination.” NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 51 (2009).
20. 6 ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 86.04[2] (2d ed. 2017).
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804 (2017).
22. MD. CONST. art. III, § 4.
23. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012); see also Ga. State Conference
of the NAACP v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1339 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015).
24. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 n.3 (2004) (5–4 decision) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4); see id. at 362 (finding that “where a State has improperly gerrymandered
congressional districts, Congress retains the power to revise the State’s districting
determinations”); Niel Franzese, Comment, The Open Our Democracy Act: A Proposal for
Effective Election Reform, 48 CONN. L. REV. 263, 285 (2015).
25. Franzese, supra note 24, at 285.
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inseparable from districting and apportionment.”26 As districting is
inherently political, legal scholars and political scientists have focused on
determining when districting for partisan advantage constitutes an
antidemocratic, unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
Political gerrymandering began shortly after the Constitution’s ratification,
which authorized state legislatures to redistrict electoral lines.27 In 1788,
Patrick Henry redrew a Virginia congressional district to unsuccessfully
weaken James Madison’s campaign.28 The term gerrymandering arose in
1812 after Governor Elbridge Gerry signed into law a redistricting plan
manipulated for partisan gain that included a salamander-shaped
Massachusetts state senate district.29
Partisan or political gerrymandering is “the drawing of legislative district
lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party
in power.”30 Although the Constitution prohibits malapportionment—
creating districts with unequal populations—political parties may manipulate
the shape of district lines for partisan advantage.31
The most common gerrymandering techniques, packing and cracking,
distribute voters to benefit the controlling political party that draws district
lines.32 Packing occurs when drafters create a single district with a
supermajority of the opposing party, while cracking is the opposite approach:
separating single-party districts into several districts to mitigate the opposing
party’s ability to obtain a majority of districts.33 Both techniques create
“wasted” votes—votes for the winning candidate exceeding the amount
needed to win or votes for the losing candidate—which reduce voters’ ability

26. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973); see also Bethune-Hill v. Va. State
Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 511 (2015) (holding that redistricting “shapes more
than the abstract boundaries of electoral districts; it shapes the character, conduct, and culture
of the representatives themselves”).
27. See Michael D. McDonald & Robin E. Best, Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics
and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases, 14 ELECTION L.J. 312, 312 (2015).
28. Brent Kendall & Jess Bravin, Gerrymandering, a Tradition as Old as the Republic,
Faces a Reckoning, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
gerrymandering-a-tradition-as-old-as-the-republic-faces-a-reckoning-1506698255
[https://perma.cc/65B3-ASXA].
29. Michael Li & Alexis Farmer, What Is Extreme Gerrymandering?, BRENNAN CTR.
JUST. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/what-is-extreme-gerrymandering
[https://perma.cc/6BHH-FVHN]; see also ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE GERRYMANDER 16–19 (1907).
30. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658
(2015). Plaintiffs have standing to challenge their own district and the entire state map to
equalize district populations and remedy vote dilution. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31,
36, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4517131 (documenting
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan’s questioning of Mr. Smith, counsel for appellees,
regarding standing for political gerrymandering claims).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 17 (noting
that malapportionment is not outlawed in U.S. Senate elections, where it is constitutionally
required).
32. Bazelon, supra note 2.
33. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 n.7 (2004); see also Kendall & Bravin, supra
note 28.
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to translate votes into legislative seats.34 Political scientists, such as Nicholas
Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee, calculate an election’s wasted votes to
determine if a districting plan provides a systemic advantage to a political
party in translating district votes into legislative seats.35 The net number of
a party’s wasted votes divided by the total number of district votes produces
the “efficiency gap” (EG)—a partisan symmetry standard that
Stephanopoulos and McGhee propose to measure when a district plan is
unconstitutional.36
Drafters use redistricting software to create district plans that comply with
state and federal requirements while maximizing partisan advantage.37 Due
to technological advances, drafters can create multiple compliant district
plans to identify each plan’s partisan effect. Redistricting software displays
not only county and municipal boundaries but also demographic information
such as minority group population and political affiliation.38 Redistricting
software can also depict the “partisan performance of a particular map under
all likely electoral scenarios,” which would enable the majority political party
to entrench itself for the duration of the enacted plan.39
Although partisan gerrymandering is constitutional and occurs in
numerous states, it conflicts with democratic principles as it prohibits voters
from translating votes into party representation.40 While wasted votes exist
in every election, the net number of wasted votes compared to the total
amount of district votes has increased since 2000.41 High levels of wasted
votes created by packed and cracked districts perpetuate a systemic
advantage for a political party that does not exist when both parties waste a
comparable number of votes.42 Redistricting after the 2010 census was
particularly consequential due to “partisan imbalance in control of state

34. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137
S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161); see id. at 854 n.79 (noting that “wasted” is a term of art).
35. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015).
36. See Eric Petry, How the Efficiency Gap Works, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/How_the_Efficiency_Gap_
Standard_Works.pdf [https://perma.cc/62EW-9APS]; see also infra note 182 and
accompanying text.
37. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census,
50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 736 (1998) (“Finer-grained census data, better predictive methods, and
more powerful computers allow for increasingly sophisticated equipopulous gerrymanders.”
(citation omitted)).
38. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 847–48; see also Nathan S. Catanese, Note,
Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 333 (2014) (noting that drafters can input voter
registration and prior election results into redistricting software to predict electoral outcomes
under particular plans).
39. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 892; see id. at 852 (stating that Republicans would
“maintain a 54 seat majority while garnering only 48% of the statewide vote”).
40. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658
(2015) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004)).
41. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42. See Petry, supra note 36, at 2.
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legislatures and governorships.”43 As of 2017, one political party controls
the state’s governorship and holds a majority in both the state senate and state
house in thirty-four states.44 In 2017, polling averages estimated that “54
percent of the [popular] vote wins Democrats 47 percent of the seats” in the
U.S. House of Representatives.45 This threat to voters’ representational
rights is of bipartisan concern as partisan gerrymanders disrupt the function
of the House of Representatives: incumbents, shielded from political
accountability, do not provide “constituent-first representation” or assist in
forming bipartisan solutions.46 Partisan gerrymandering disrupts politicians’
traditional attention toward issues particular to their district, such as control
of resources.47 Politicians’ focus on their district’s identity encourages
political competition; furthermore, maintaining prior political boundaries
facilitates effective partnerships between representatives and local officials
to pass legislation.48
B. Courts’ Involvement in Redistricting
This Part provides an overview of judicial involvement in redistricting
congressional and state legislative districts and in adjudicating constitutional
challenges to the apportionment of congressional and state legislative
districts. Part I.B.1 discusses the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution, which affords state courts—in addition to the state
legislatures—primary authority to apportion their congressional and state
legislative districts. Part I.B.2 then analyzes the Supreme Court’s mandate
that federal courts ensure the placement of valid redistricting plans, focusing
specifically on Scott v. Germano49 and Growe v. Emison.50 Part I.B.3
discusses the authority Congress provided to federal courts to adjudicate
constitutional apportionment challenges.

43. Bernard Grofman & German Feierherd, The U.S. Could Be Free of Gerrymandering.
Here’s How Other Countries Do Redestricting., WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/07/the-supreme-courtwill-soon-consider-gerrymandering-heres-how-changes-in-redistricting-could-reduce-it/
[https://perma.cc/HX7R-BV2N].
44. State
Government
Trifectas,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/State_
government_trifectas [https://perma.cc/8CZK-7HDZ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
45. Matthew Yglesias, Democrats’ 2018 Gerrymandering Problem Is Really Bad, VOX
(Aug.
24,
2017,
4:30
PM),
https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/policy-andpolitics/2017/8/24/16199564/democrats-2018-gerrymandering-problem
[https://perma.cc/KFQ6-JEFL]. Notably, in presidential elections, Barack Obama won
slightly less than 53 percent of the vote in 2009, and George H.W. Bush won just over 53
percent of the vote in 1988. Id.; see also MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4 (finding that if
Democrats won 54 percent of the vote, they would have a fifty-fifty chance of regaining
control of the House of Representatives).
46. Brief for Bipartisan Group of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellees at 4–5, 10–11, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (Sept. 5, 2017)
(No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4311097.
47. Id. at 6–8.
48. Id.
49. 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
50. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
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1. Redistricting by State Courts
The Constitution mandates that Congress reapportion the number of
federal congressional seats each state receives after every decennial U.S.
census.51 Then, the Constitution authorizes state legislatures to redistrict
congressional and state legislative district maps based on the census’s
population shifts.52
The Supreme Court requires “federal judges to defer consideration of
disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative or
judicial branch, has begun to address that highly political task itself.”53 In
Germano, the Supreme Court articulated state courts’ important role in
redistricting: “The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid
reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been
recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases
has been specifically encouraged.”54 Thus, the Supreme Court interpreted
the Elections Clause as providing primary apportionment authority to
“appropriate [state] agencies,” including state supreme courts.55
In the 1990s, state courts actively developed redistricting plans after
district courts granted declaratory or injunctive relief to plaintiffs in
redistricting litigation.56 Although no “specific provision of statutory or
constitutional law clearly granted subject-matter jurisdiction to the courts, the
general authority of courts to provide remedies for civil wrongs” allows state
supreme courts to actively develop remedial redistricting plans.57 The Full
Faith and Credit Act requires that federal courts give state courts’
redistricting plans the same effect as the state’s federal court-drawn plans.58
Unlike legislatively enacted plans, federal courts cannot modify the state
court’s redistricting plan except by certiorari from the Supreme Court on
appeal from the state’s highest court.59

51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the
several States . . . according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by [the
U.S. population] . . . .”). The decennial U.S. census collects population data to reapportion the
number of federal congressional districts each state receives. See 13 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2012).
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The . . . Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”). Although the
text of Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution only grants authority to the state
legislature to apportion congressional districts, the Supreme Court has held that state and
federal courts have jurisdiction to develop legislative and congressional redistricting plans
where the legislature fails to act. See Growe, 507 U.S. at 34 (noting that “Germano prefers
both state branches to federal courts as agents of apportionment”); Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First
Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986); Germano, 381 U.S. at 409.
53. Growe, 507 U.S. at 33.
54. Germano, 381 U.S. at 409.
55. Id. In Germano, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Northern District of
Illinois to fix a reasonable time in which the state agencies, including the state judiciary, “may
validly redistrict the Illinois State Senate” provided that the agency creates the plan so that it
is utilized in the next election. Id.
56. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 130.
57. Id. at 131.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
59. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986).
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2. Redistricting by Federal Courts
In Growe, the Supreme Court authorized federal district courts not only to
require state agencies to implement a constitutionally valid reapportionment
plan before state redistricting deadlines but also to develop redistricting plans
in limited circumstances.60 Federal district courts, however, cannot
affirmatively obstruct state reapportionment nor permit federal litigation to
impede state reapportionment.61 In Growe, the Supreme Court affirmed the
holding in Germano, which requires federal district courts to defer to state
judicial or legislative redistricting absent evidence that either branch will fail
to produce a constitutional redistricting plan before the state’s redistricting
deadline.62 However, in reapportionment litigation, federal district courts
maintain jurisdiction over state legislative redistricting efforts until the
adoption of a valid reapportionment plan.63 For example, as the legislature
cures districting violations, the district court may set deadlines for legislative
action, allow state court review of proposed plans, or appoint a special master
to create a contingent plan.64 If the state’s agencies do not implement a
timely redistricting plan that conforms to federal law, the district court can
either instruct the state legislature to remedy the existing legal violations or
develop and implement its own constitutional plan before the next election.65
3. Adjudication by Courts
Congress passed statutes affording three-judge district courts jurisdiction
to adjudicate the constitutionality of apportionment plans with direct appeal
to the Supreme Court.66 In 1910, Congress created such courts, each
containing at least one federal appellate judge, for “parties seeking relief
against state officials.”67 The reason for creating a three-judge court was to
“encourage greater deliberation . . . before a grant of injunctive relief, to lend
greater dignity to the proceedings, and to provide expedited Supreme Court

60. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993).
61. Id. at 36.
62. Id. Compare Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the district
court’s deferral abstention until the conclusion of state proceedings was proper but that the
district failed to retain jurisdiction), with Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.
1991) (finding that the district court’s denial of defendants’ request to stay court’s judgment
that the elections be held pursuant to interim court-drawn plans was proper to avoid postponing
primary elections), aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
63. Growe, 507 U.S. at 29, 31. A federal district court may establish a deadline for the
state court to act before the federal court redistricts. Id. at 34.
64. Id. at 29.
65. Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409–10 (1965); see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 155–60 (listing deadlines for state legislatures to redistrict).
Alaska requires that the commission report a plan ninety days after receiving official census
data, whereas Arizona does not set a specific date by which the legislature must redistrict.
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 155.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012).
67. Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 84 (1996); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012).
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correction if necessary.”68 In a 1976 amendment, Congress narrowed the
authority of three-judge district courts to actions “challenging the
constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the
apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”69 As amended, § 2284(a)
also indirectly allows three-judge district courts to adjudicate VRA claims.70
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court formed constitutional requirements for
congressional and state legislative district maps. In Baker v. Carr,71 the
Supreme Court declared that malapportionment challenges to legislative
district maps were justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, where vote
dilution based on where voters lived failed to provide voters “equal
protection of the laws.”72 In addition to recognizing a malapportionment
cause of action, Justice William Brennan articulated six factors by which
courts could determine whether a case presented a nonjusticiable political
question.73 In partisan gerrymandering cases, “a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards” is the primary reason why the
Supreme Court has never declared a district plan to be an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander.74
After Baker, subsequent malapportionment challenges limited the extent
to which state legislatures could draw district maps for partisan advantage.75
Such limitations prompted the “reapportionment revolution.”76 In Reynolds
and Wesberry v. Sanders,77 the Supreme Court constitutionalized the
principle of “one person, one vote”;78 state governments must equalize
populations across state legislative and federal congressional districts to
68. Solimine, supra note 67, at 84. Congress passed this legislation to curtail individual
federal judges granting injunctions against state governments. Id.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
70. Solimine, supra note 67, at 97. Although § 2284(a) does not reference the VRA, the
Senate Judiciary Committee report noted that three-judge courts should adjudicate VRA
claims. Id. at 95–97 (“[T]hree-judge courts, virtually without discussion, apparently have
exercised a form of pendent jurisdiction to adjudicate Voting Rights Act claims concurrently
with the constitutional (i.e., apportionment) claim.”); see also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.
1455, 1464 n.2 (2017) (noting that three-judge district courts determine the constitutionality
of congressional districts).
71. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
72. Id. at 188.
73. Id. at 217.
74. Id. The remaining factors are (1) “[T]extually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”; (2) “[T]he impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”;
(3) “[T]he impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government”; (4) “[A]n unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”; and (5) “[T]he potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
Id.
75. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 22–23.
76. Id. at 22; Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
751, 755 (2004).
77. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
78. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. While the equal population requirement for
congressional districts derives from Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to create legislative districts
of equal population. Id. at 2; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
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satisfy Article I of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause.79 In
Reynolds, the Supreme Court required state governments to redistrict after
each decennial census to create districts of roughly equal populations.80
In Davis v. Bandemer,81 the Supreme Court held that the one-person, onevote principle applies to partisan gerrymandering; partisan gerrymandering
claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.82 While the
Supreme Court in Bandemer stated that judges have a duty to review
redistricting claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the Justices disagreed
on a method to identify unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.83 In her
concurrence, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor contended that partisan
gerrymandering claims present a nonjusticiable political question because the
Equal Protection Clause lacks “judicially discoverable and manageable
standards”84 for resolution and the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not intend to provide political parties with an equal share of power.85
Despite the Supreme Court’s position that “an equal protection challenge
to a political gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy,”86 the
Court has never invalidated an electoral district for partisan
gerrymandering.87 Thus, although the Supreme Court recognized partisan
gerrymandering as a cause of action in the 1980s, it has not since held a
district plan unconstitutional on that ground88 as a majority of the Court has
yet to agree upon a “manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining
whether a partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution.”89 In League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC),90 Justice Kennedy,
79. See Cox, supra note 76, at 757.
80. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583; see also Cox, supra note 76, at 757–78, 758 n.36 (finding
that the Reynolds court did not “lay down a rule that states must redistrict immediately
following each census,” but reapportionment with less frequency “would raise a presumption
of unconstitutionality”).
81. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
82. Id. at 110, 115, 123–27 (noting that plaintiffs who allege that the state legislature’s
district plan violated their right, as Democrats or Republicans, to equal protection must prove
both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who
concurred in the Court’s decision, argued that granting justiciability to political
gerrymandering claims would cause judicial intervention in the political process, when the
Fourteenth Amendment does not grant a right of proportional representation—receiving the
same percentage of seats as the percentage of votes received—to political parties. Id. at 147
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 41 (quoting
Chief Justice Roberts as saying that proportional representation “has never been accepted as a
political principle in the history of this country”).
83. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 185 n.25.
84. Id. at 148 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
85. Id. at 147.
86. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 413–14 (2006)
(citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 118–27).
87. Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Major Challenge to Partisan Gerrymandering, N.Y.
TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/us/politics/justices-to-hearmajor-challenge-to-partisan-gerrymandering.html [https://perma.cc/6JLR-T4M7].
88. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 35, at 831. In LULAC, the Court upheld Vieth
and concluded that Texas’s middecade redistricting did not consist of an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 414, 423.
89. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 414.
90. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
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writing for the majority, upheld Vieth v. Jubelirer91 but refused to revisit the
plurality’s position on justiciability.92 Until a majority of the Supreme Court
agrees upon a standard to measure political fairness, partisan gerrymandering
will remain a nonjusticiable political question. Left to the political process
and without judicial scrutiny, state legislatures will continue to create
partisan gerrymanders.
II. CURRENT DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN
REDISTRICTING AND ADJUDICATING REDISTRICTING CLAIMS
Due to the detrimental effects of partisan gerrymandering, political
scientists such as Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Eric McGhee, Andrew Gelman,
and Gary King formulated quantitative standards to define and measure
political fairness in redistricting plans.93 These scholars argue that removing
partisan gerrymandering claims from the political question doctrine will
restrict partisan gerrymandering, as redistricting plans would receive judicial
scrutiny, and establish a political threshold to assist drafters.94 Federal
courts’ ability to adjudicate such claims, however, will not limit state
legislatures from implementing partisan redistricting plans.95 After the 2010
census, plaintiffs in Perez v. Abbott,96 registered voters in two Texas counties
and a member of the Texas legislature, successfully proved gerrymandering
in several federal court-drawn maps.97 This Part evaluates whether federal
91. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
92. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 414.
93. See LAURA ROYDEN & MICHAEL LI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXTREME MAPS 4
(2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Extreme%20Maps%
205.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HY8-LPH9] (assessing partisan bias and gerrymandering
through three quantitative tests: the efficiency gap, the seats-to-votes curve, and the meanmedian district vote share difference); Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 536; Stephanopoulos
& McGhee, supra note 35, at 831. King proposed the symmetry standard as a measure of
fairness in LULAC, but Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, rejected the standard due to
its reliance on hypothetical causes for asymmetry and its failure to determine how much
partisan advantage is unconstitutional. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420.
94. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 35, at 886–87.
95. If the Supreme Court holds partisan gerrymandering claims to be justiciable, then it
likely will impose a limitation on justiciability as these cases are the Court’s mandatory
jurisdiction. If a party appeals the judgment of the three-judge panel, then the Supreme Court
must decide the case on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 30, at 37 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts stated that political
gerrymandering cases fall within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction).
96. No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 3495922 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2017).
97. Perez, 2017 WL 3495922, at *44–45; see also Second Amended Complaint at 1,
Perez, 2017 WL 3495922 (No. SA-11-CV-360). On appeal, the Supreme Court consolidated
and granted hearings on cases numbered 17-586 and 17-626, dismissed cases numbered 17680 and 17-780, and granted the application for stay pending appeal on case 17A245. See
Morris v. Texas, No. 17-780 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2018) (mem.) (dismissing appeal); Tex.
Democratic Party v. Abbott, No. 17-680 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2018) (mem.) (dismissing appeal);
Abbott v. Perez, No. 17-586 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018) (mem.) (granting hearing); Abbott v. Perez,
No. 17-626 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018) (mem.) (granting hearing); Abbott v. Perez, No. 17A245 (U.S.
Sept. 12, 2017) (mem.) (granting application for stay pending appeal). In Perez, a three-judge
panel in San Antonio created new district maps for temporary use for the 2012 election as
Texas’s 2011 maps were in litigation on charges of racial gerrymandering. Perez, 2017 WL
3495922, at *2–4. Racial gerrymandering is “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district
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courts should have the authority to create redistricting plans and to adjudicate
partisan gerrymandering claims. This Part also examines the effect of each
approach on current redistricting litigation.
To protect voters’
representational rights, the judiciary should alter its current approach to
redistricting.
Part II.A outlines the common argument that federal district courts should
not have the authority to redistrict in limited circumstances given that they
cannot adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims, including claims that
court-drawn maps are unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders. Part II.B then
presents the opposing argument: federal courts should adjudicate partisan
gerrymandering claims because the Supreme Court granted federal courts the
authority to redistrict electoral maps in certain circumstances.
A. Judicial Removal from Redistricting
This Part sets forth the following positions: first, federal courts should not
redistrict electoral maps due to the legislative nature of redistricting, the
judiciary’s lack of political authority, and the absence of judicial review;
second, federal courts should continue to declare partisan gerrymandering
claims a nonjusticiable political question and refrain from proposing their
own standard to maintain judicial integrity. This Part also examines the
effects of this approach.
1. Federal Courts Should Not Redistrict
The “one-person, one-vote” revolution not only created a new
constitutional redistricting standard but also emphasized that “legislative
reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and
determination.”98 Although the Supreme Court authorized federal courts to
redistrict in certain circumstances, the Court referred to the judiciary’s
authority as an “unwelcome obligation of performing in the legislature’s
stead.”99
Redistricting is “one of the most significant acts a State can perform to
ensure citizen participation in republican self-governance.”100 When
redistricting, federal courts must address “‘hard remedial problems’ in
minimizing friction between their remedies and legitimate state policies.”101
The federal judiciary did not provide a “uniform formula” or “rigid
mathematical standard[]” to assist courts in striking such a balance.102
boundaries . . . for [racial] purposes.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) (alterations in
original) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)). In a racial gerrymandering claim, “the injury has to be localized to
the place where that district is.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 31 (quoting
counsel for appellees’ description of a Shaw v. Reno claim).
98. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964).
99. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); see also League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006).
100. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 416.
101. Connor, 431 U.S. at 414 (quoting Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 (1972)).
102. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
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Although the Supreme Court provided general guidance on how to create
legislative reapportionment plans, the judiciary lacks the “political
authoritativeness” of state legislatures.103 Federal courts do not possess a
“distinctive mandate” to resolve conflicts between state apportionment
policies and constitutional and statutory standards.104 Rather, federal courts
must form a remedial plan that is not arbitrary or discriminatory.105
The Supreme Court not only discourages federal courts from redistricting
but also prefers legislatively enacted plans to court-drawn maps.106 The
judiciary maintains its integrity by favoring legislative plans as they represent
the will of voters rather than that of life-tenured district court judges.
Furthermore, democratic legitimacy requires that elected representatives
conduct legislative functions. In contrast, district judges who create voting
districts operate outside of the democratic process.107 Federal district courts
may implement court-drawn reapportionment plans pending later legislative
action.108 After the adoption of a court-drawn plan, state legislatures may
replace the court’s remedial measure by enacting their own constitutionally
valid design.109 When a legislature seeks to replace a court-drawn plan, “no
presumption of impropriety [attaches] to the legislative decision to act.”110
Although courts prefer legislatively enacted plans to court-remedial
measures, the judiciary upholds its enacted plan if the legislature seeks to
adopt “improper criteria for districting determinations.”111
Furthermore, state legislatures may draw district plans with some partisan
bias to benefit the political party in control and to reflect the state’s political
demographics as long as such districts conform to constitutional and statutory
standards. Representatives seek to continue drafting voting districts given
their familiarity with existing political boundaries and relationships with
local officials.112 Courts, by contrast, are neutral arbiters and cannot develop
a district plan with partisan bias. Yet, courts inadvertently create racial and

103. Connor, 431 U.S. at 414–15; see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 415.
104. Connor, 431 U.S. at 415.
105. Id.
106. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 416 (“Congress is the federal body explicitly given constitutional
power over elections. . . . A lawful, legislatively enacted plan should be preferable to one
drawn by the courts.”).
107. Contrary to elections holding representatives accountable, the judiciary can redistrict
without political or judicial scrutiny as long as court-drawn maps satisfy constitutional and
statutory requirements and partisan gerrymandering claims remain a nonjusticiable political
question. See Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1982).
108. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 415.
109. Id. at 416.
110. Id.
111. Id. Beyond preference, federal courts hold court-drawn plans to stricter standards than
legislatively enacted maps. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 407 (1977) (“[U]nless there
are persuasive justifications, a court-ordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature
must . . . ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis
variation.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26–27
(1975))).
112. Brief for Bipartisan Group of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellees at 6–8, 10–11, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (Sept. 5, 2017)
(No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4311097.
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partisan gerrymanders when applying constitutional and statutory standards
because courts are not required to consider the political effects of
constitutional plans.
In Perez, a three-judge panel in the Western District of Texas enacted
interim congressional and state legislative redistricting plans for the 2012
election after registered voters in Bexar and Harris Counties and a member
of the Texas legislature filed lawsuits alleging that Texas’s 2011 redistricting
plans violated the Equal Protection Clause and section two of the VRA.113
After the Texas legislature enacted the court’s interim plans without change
in 2013, registered voters alleged that these maps maintained discriminatory
features of the 2011 plans.114 In 2017, a three-judge panel of the Western
District of Texas held that the Texas legislature’s 2013 enactment of the
court’s 2012 interim plans constituted racial gerrymandering because the
legislature did not eliminate from the 2012 plans the racially discriminatory
features found in the 2011 plans.115
The federal court’s involvement in Perez demonstrates the consequences
of judicial participation in implementing interim plans. Although the court
informed the state legislature that the interim plans were not final
determinations of the merits of the plaintiff’s claims,116 the potential
consequences of state legislatures enacting court-drawn plans without change
imposes a higher duty upon the judiciary to create constitutional plans.
2. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims
Should Remain a Political Question
While the judiciary has authority to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering
claims, federal courts’ ability to determine whether districts plans are
politically fair is also an “unwelcome obligation of performing in the
legislature’s stead” because the legislature has primary authority over
legislative reapportionment, including partisan advantage.117 The Supreme
Court could make a political—rather than legal—determination if it proposed
a threshold to determine constitutionality. Thus, partisan gerrymandering
claims should remain nonjusticiable because the Court has not approved of
“judicially discernible and manageable standards [to adjudicate]” these

113. Perez v. Abbott, No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 3495922, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15,
2017). In 2011, Texas was subject to the preclearance requirements of section five of the
VRA, and the United States District Court of District of Columbia had not precleared the
state’s plans in time for the upcoming election. Id. at *2; see also Second Amended Complaint
at 1, Perez, 2017 WL 3495922 (No. SA-11-CV-360).
114. Perez, 2017 WL 3495922, at *2–4. The court emphasized that their “interim map[s]
[were] a result of preliminary determinations” and “not a final ruling on the merits of any
claims.” Id. at *2.
115. Id. at *44.
116. Id. at *2.
117. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); see also League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006).
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claims.118 The Supreme Court has never declared a partisan gerrymander
unconstitutional.119
After Bandemer, no case articulated a standard for federal courts to
determine whether a redistricting plan was too political.120 Eighteen years
after the Court held in Bandemer that political gerrymandering claims are
justiciable, a plurality of the Court in Vieth concluded that partisan
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable political questions because no
“judicially discernible and manageable standards” existed to adjudicate
whether a district map containing partisan advantage unconstitutionally
undermined the minority party.121 The plurality rejected the Bandemer
standards for constitutionality because partisan gerrymandering required a
standard different from racial gerrymandering, as the Bandemer standards
were unmanageable or contrary to precedent.122 Rather than suggesting an
alternative standard, the plurality adopted Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in
Bandemer.123 By refusing to intervene, the plurality permitted the political
process and state governments to resolve partisan gerrymandering.
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy argued that until courts have a
manageable and nonpartisan standard to define fair districting, courts’
adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims “would risk assuming
political, not legal, responsibility” for the districting process.124 Justice
Kennedy, however, left open the possibility that subsequent plaintiffs might
118. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 404
(concluding that plaintiffs must “show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on [their]
representational rights” to successfully identify unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering).
Justice Breyer suggests standards manageable by courts as opposed to social scientists or
computer experts. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 11–13.
119. Liptak, supra note 87. The Supreme Court has declared district maps designed to
disenfranchise minority voters to be unconstitutional. Kendall & Bravin, supra note 28.
120. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279. Two years later, in LULAC, Justice Kennedy stated that
Texas’s middecade redistricting was not “sufficiently suspect to give shape to a reliable
standard.” LULAC, 548 U.S. at 423.
121. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281. In Vieth, the plurality rejected plaintiff’s proportionalrepresentation test for fair districting. Id. at 287–89. Justice Antonin Scalia stated that the
Constitution “guarantees equal protection of the law to persons, not equal representation in
government to equivalently sized groups.” Id. at 288. Furthermore, the plurality stated that
proportional representation is not judicially manageable as the standard does not define
“majority status.” Id.; see also Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949–50 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that “the equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on
improper districting practices” post-Vieth).
122. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 283, 287–90 (noting that lower courts struggled to determine
unconstitutional discriminatory effect). To limit judicial discretion, the plurality in Vieth
required that plaintiffs provide a definition of fairness and a standard to measure fairness in
redistricting plans. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 44–45.
123. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy J., concurring) (noting that the Court requires a
model, which shows that a party applied political classifications “in an invidious manner or in
a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective”). In her concurrence in Bandemer,
Justice O’Connor stated that drawing district plans through the legislative process “is a critical
and traditional part of politics [that] . . . foster[s] active participation in the political parties. . . .
[C]hallenges to the manner in which an apportionment has been carried out—by the very
parties that are responsible for this process—present a political question in the truest sense of
the term.” Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
124. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307.
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find a suitable standard to determine when redistricting plans burden political
groups’ representational rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.125
Although the plurality did not technically overrule the justiciability of
political gerrymandering claims, the plurality’s opinion and Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence signal that a majority of the Court was unwilling “to
overturn districting plans on grounds of partisan gerrymandering.”126
The Supreme Court requires a manageable standard to intervene on the
ground of partisan gerrymandering to maintain the Court’s integrity. A
concrete standard discredits public belief that the Court reached its decision
based on each Justice’s political appointment.127 A manageable standard
would limit judicial intervention to only extreme cases, which would ensure
the stability of most district plans and prevent the judiciary from entering
“this political thicket.”128 Justice Breyer’s dissent in Vieth, however, notes
that “pure politics” can help “secure constitutionally important democratic
objectives.”129 Political accountability is one advantage of partisanmotivated districting.130 Thus, a manageable standard must distinguish
between justified and unjustified uses of political factors.131
Since the Court rendered its decision in Vieth, scholars have proposed
quantitative tests to measure fair districting.132 The three-judge panel in
Whitford v. Gill133 relied upon the efficiency gap in determining that
Wisconsin’s state assembly map was an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander.134 The EG aggregates the results of a redistricting plan’s
packing and cracking into one number: the difference between a parties’

125. Id. at 314 (“First Amendment concerns arise where an apportionment has the purpose
and effect of burdening a group of voters’ representational rights.”). Under the First
Amendment, plaintiffs could allege that, although they live in a district represented by their
party, the state legislature’s district plan violates their right of representation and association
with other state party supporters by inhibiting their ability to campaign for a party majority in
the state assembly. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 30–31, 35 (“First
Amendment concerns arise where a state enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of
subjecting a group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment by reason of their views.”).
126. MCGANN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
127. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 42 (quoting Justice Alito as saying
that Chief Justice Roberts questioned whether the efficiency gap’s 7 percent threshold was too
arbitrary to garner public respect).
128. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
129. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 28–29 (quoting Ms. Murphy,
counsel for amici curiae, noting that Justice Breyer’s dissent in Vieth discussed the benefits of
districting for partisan advantage).
131. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 360 (noting that “maintaining relatively stable legislatures in
which a minority party retains significant representation” is a justified use of political factors
to draw district boundaries).
132. See ROYDEN & LI, supra note 93, at 4; see also Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra
note 35, at 831.
133. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No.
16-1161).
134. Id. at 898 (holding that the plaintiffs met their burden, measured by the efficiency gap,
on their representational rights claim).
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wasted votes in an election.135 Although the Supreme Court might recognize
the EG as a manageable standard, the Court should affirm its position on
justiciability until additional scholarship sufficiently tests the EG.136
Compliance with traditional districting factors, such as VRA requirements,
protection of incumbents, and political geography, can generate a high EG
apart from intentional partisan gerrymandering.137
Furthermore, even if the EG can provide a definition of fair partisan
districting and a standard to measure it, the EG is not a reliable measure to
predict the amount of partisan advantage a particular redistricting plan will
achieve.138 The EG relies on election data; it cannot assist state legislatures
in identifying districting measures that constitute partisan gerrymandering.139
Case law on the issue indicates that “mid-decade redistricting, incumbent
protection, unproportional representation in a single election and pairing
minority party incumbents” do not, by themselves, constitute partisan
gerrymandering.140 The 7 percent threshold recommended by Professor
Simon Jackman, an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Whitford, only
identifies when a map is too political after an election; it does not identify
which districting measures caused the high EG.141
Advocates who believe that the Court should not adjudicate partisan
gerrymandering claims might return to Justice Brennan’s six-factor test to
determine whether a case presented a political question and argue that
partisan gerrymandering claims fall under two additional factors: (1) “the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion” and (2) “the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government.”142
Regarding the first factor, the Court could declare that partisan
gerrymandering claims remain a political question until Congress determines
how much partisan bias states may include or consider when developing
redistricting plans. As to the second factor, if the Court enacted its own
135. Id. at 861 (“[A]n EG of 7% in favor of one party in the first election year of a plan
almost certainly means that the EG will favor that same party in each subsequent election year
under that plan.”).
136. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 44 (noting that Justice Alito stated
that the efficiency gap does not address how to factor uncontested elections into its analysis).
137. Id. at 53–54 (quoting Justice Alito as saying that “factors that have nothing to do with
gerrymandering” can cause a high EG).
138. See Christopher P. Chambers et al., Flaws in the Efficiency Gap, 33 J.L. & POL. 1, 33
(2017) (noting the efficiency gap’s flaws, including limits to political competition and harm
to the major political party that did not draft the districting plans).
139. Unlike the Supreme Court’s approach to racial gerrymandering, where “race for its
own sake, and not other districting principles, [cannot be the] legislature’s dominant and
controlling rationale in drawing its district lines,” the Court has not held that partisan
advantage cannot be the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale for drawing its district
lines. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995).
140. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 126.
141. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 860–61 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (finding that a high
EG, 7 percent, “in the first year of a redistricting plan likely means that the EG will remain
high for the lifetime of the plan”).
142. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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standard that determined fair districting, it could be argued that the Court
lacked respect for Congress, which has constitutional authority to regulate
redistricting.
3. Effects of This Approach
If the Supreme Court maintains its current position—that partisan
gerrymandering is a justiciable cause of action which remains a
nonjusticiable political question until scholars present a judicially
manageable standard—then the Court likely will not propose its own
standard so as to maintain the judiciary’s legitimacy and integrity. If the
Court proposes its own standard to determine political fairness, such as a
threshold proposed by the efficiency gap, then critics could argue that the
Court has constitutionalized an arbitrary political determination by which
state legislatures can justifiably deviate from a number-based threshold. If
the Court adopts a number-based standard, then it needs to articulate how the
standard accounts for partisan bias resulting from compliance with VRA
requirements and limits judicial intervention: ensuring the stability of most
district plans.
As the Supreme Court awaits a judicially manageable standard to
determine when partisan advantage is unconstitutional, state legislatures can
implement redistricting plans for extreme partisan gain without judicial
scrutiny as long as the plan meets the one-person, one-vote and the VRA
requirements before the state’s redistricting deadlines.143 If federal and state
courts could not create remedial redistricting plans, then there would be no
judicial check on partisan gerrymandering. State legislatures could develop
district plans with extreme partisan advantage without judicial involvement
before or after the plan’s enactment. District plans with extreme partisan bias
would remain in effect until either the state legislature conducted middecade
redistricting or until the following decennial census.
Although judicial authority to redistrict is an “unwelcome obligation,” it
safeguards voters’ representational rights.144 If a state legislature failed to
implement a constitutional plan before the state’s redistricting deadline and
the judiciary could not intervene, then either the election would not occur or
voters would elect public officials under prior districting plans, resulting in a
violation of the one-person, one-vote requirement.145 Such maps would also
violate section two of the VRA as old district maps could effectively dilute
minority voters’ “ability to elect candidates of their choice.”146 Although the

143. J. Gerald Herbert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform to
Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 551 (2011).
144. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977).
145. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (2012) (listing procedures to elect representatives when a state has
not redistricted after any apportionment).
146. Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336,
1339 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2015). Section 2 of the VRA prohibits state or political subdivisions
from implementing voting qualifications, standards, practices, or procedures that deny or
abridge the right of any U.S. citizen “to vote on account of race or color.” Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
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federal judiciary would remain active in adjudicating claims of racial
gerrymandering, the state legislature’s remedial plan, complying with section
two of the VRA, could lawfully consist of partisan gerrymanders.
If partisan gerrymandering continues, then voter turnout will likely
decline:
when citizens believe that their state’s redistricting plan
predetermines election results, they are less likely to vote.147 Competitive
races have higher voter turnout.148 As partisan gerrymandering continues,
voter turnout will decrease in states with high partisan advantage as
individual voters will believe that gerrymandering eliminates their ability to
translate votes into legislative seats.149 Furthermore, in gerrymandered
states, political opponents may not challenge the incumbent as the opponent
would need to win more than the majority.150 Although the Court believes
that democracy should resolve partisan gerrymandering, its unwillingness to
declare districting plans unconstitutional is antidemocratic, as it allows state
legislatures to manipulate the composition of federal and state legislatures for
ten years.151
B. Judicial Involvement in Redistricting
This Part discusses the following positions, which contrast with the
legislature’s role discussed in Part II.A. First, district courts should continue
to redistrict electoral maps to safeguard voters’ representational rights
because federal courts have regulated legislative and congressional district
maps since Baker. Second, federal courts should adjudicate partisan
gerrymandering claims because the plaintiffs in Whitford and Benisek
proposed judicially manageable standards to determine fair districting. This
Part also examines the effects of this approach.
1. Federal Courts Should Continue to Redistrict
Advocates who support the federal judiciary’s involvement in redistricting
argue that federal courts should maintain jurisdiction over state legislative
redistricting efforts until a state agency or a federal court adopts a valid
reapportionment plan.152 Although Congress has constitutional authority to

147. See Robert Colton, Note, Back to the Drawing Board: Revisiting the Supreme Court’s
Stance on Partisan Gerrymandering, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1303, 1310 (2017). State
legislatures, defending challenged maps, argue that traditional districting criteria or a state’s
natural political geography cause partisan effects. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837,
911 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
148. See Catanese, supra note 38, at 340.
149. Id. In gerrymandered states, citizens might believe that representatives choose their
voters rather than voters choosing their representatives.
150. Id. at 341–42 (discussing the impact of gerrymandering on public policy and public
officials).
151. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 38–39 (quoting Mr. Smith, counsel for
appellees, stating that an unbounded “festival of copycat gerrymandering” will occur if the
Court does not provide a judicial remedy for partisan gerrymandering).
152. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 31 (1993).
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regulate partisan gerrymandering,153 this should not limit courts’
involvement.154 Federal courts have regulated state elections under the
Fourteenth Amendment since Reynolds and Baker.155 In Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,156 the
Supreme Court held that the Elections Clause permits nonlegislative
redistricting, which includes independent commissions.157 Although courts
lack the political authoritativeness over the state legislature in creating
redistricting plans, federal courts must follow state redistricting policy and
constitutional and statutory guidelines to develop a plan that remedies the
state agency’s violations but includes as much of the state’s legislature’s
redistricting law as possible.158 Such constraints limit the judiciary’s
discretion in developing redistricting plans to remediate legislative
violations.159
Federal courts should redistrict in limited circumstances to prevent a
political party that controls the state legislature, house, and governorship
from drawing electoral lines to affect partisan balance and the representation
of political communities. When a political party controls state government,
judicial involvement safeguards voters’ representational rights because
federal district courts do not intend to implement plans with partisan
advantage; the state legislature’s proposed redistricting plan is the foundation
of federal courts’ remedial plans. In these circumstances, federal courts
could develop more politically fair district plans that retain competitive
districts and reflect the distribution of state party power by respecting
existing political boundaries, as opposed to gerrymandered districts that
entrench a political party’s majority for the duration of the plan.
Furthermore, federal courts use the same redistricting technology that
legislatures use to entrench the party in power to mitigate the proposed plan’s
partisan effects.160

153. Congress has this power pursuant to the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXVI.
154. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 60–61 (providing examples of the
Court regulating election abuses by state government); see Franzese, supra note 24, at 285
(noting that although Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution “gives Congress the power to
supersede state regulations of congressional elections, Congress has not used this power to
divest states of redistricting authority” (quoting Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and
Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 409, 413)).
155. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 60–61.
156. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
157. Id. at 2659 (permitting use of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission in
congressional and legislative districting).
158. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1982).
159. In Connor, the Court analyzed whether the district court “properly exercised its
equitable discretion in reconciling the requirements of the Constitution with the goals of state
political policy.” Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 430 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
160. Perez v. Abbott, No. SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 3495922, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15,
2017).
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2. Federal Courts Should Adjudicate
Partisan Gerrymandering Claims
The Supreme Court recognizes that partisan gerrymanders “[are
incompatible] with democratic principles”;161 yet a majority of the Court has
not agreed upon a substantive standard to determine when partisan advantage
in a districting plan is unconstitutional. In LULAC, Justice Kennedy stated
that a successful partisan gerrymandering case “show[s] a burden, as
measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants’ representational
rights.”162 In subsequent litigation, such as Whitford, voters affected by
gerrymandered districts proposed standards to determine the plan’s burden
on their representational rights.163
Although the Supreme Court has not agreed upon a standard for
constitutionality, courts agree that a plaintiff must establish the state’s
discriminatory intent and a discriminatory partisan effect to prove that a
state’s redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause. A plaintiff
must provide “a reliable measure of how much partisan dominance a plan
achieves”164 and “a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is
too much.”165 Courts disagree, however, over the extent to which plaintiffs
must prove discriminatory effect.
In November 2016, Wisconsin’s three-judge panel invalidated the state’s
redistricting plan—Act 43—for partisan gerrymandering in Whitford.166 The
plaintiffs in Whitford—registered Democratic voters and supporters claiming
injury on behalf of all Democrats in Wisconsin—based their challenge on a
First Amendment’s freedom of association test in addition to a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection test, in line with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
in Vieth.167 The majority held that the plaintiffs demonstrated “that the
defendants intended and accomplished an entrenchment of the Republican
Party likely to endure for the entire decennial period. They did so when the
legitimate redistricting considerations neither required nor warranted the
implementation of such a plan.”168

161. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2658 (alteration in original) (quoting
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004)).
162. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006).
163. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 898 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted,
137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161).
164. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 19, at 126.
165. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420.
166. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 930.
167. Id. at 883–84 (“It is clear that the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
protect a citizen against state discrimination as to the weight of his or her vote when that
discrimination is based on the political preferences of the voter.”); Complaint at 7, Whitford,
218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc), 2015 WL 4651084; see also Shapiro v.
McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 456 (2015) (noting that a First Amendment claim against a specific
congressional district required a trial on the merits).
168. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 883. In Whitford, the plaintiffs proposed a test for
partisan gerrymandering: first, the plaintiffs must establish the state’s intent to create partisan
gerrymanders; second, they must prove a partisan effect, through the efficiency gap, above a
certain threshold, which renders the plan presumptively unconstitutional; third, the state bears
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In analyzing whether a state legislature possessed discriminatory intent,
courts consider the circumstances surrounding the plan’s design and
implementation. In Whitford, the state legislature enacted the most partisan
possible map under state law and traditional districting principles.169 Courts
also consider whether legislatures removed competitive districts as swing
districts are less partisan than districts controlled by incumbents. A
redistricting plan “that more closely reflects the distribution of state party
power seems a less likely vehicle for partisan discrimination than one that
entrenches an electoral minority.”170
The district court in Whitford held that Wisconsin’s district maps burdened
Democratic voters’ representational rights “by impeding their ability to
translate their votes into legislative seats.”171 The court relied upon new
social science models, the efficiency gap and partisan symmetry, to measure
the plans’ partisan advantage.172 Professor Jackman, an expert witness for
the plaintiffs, testified that a high EG, like 7 percent, “in the first year of a
redistricting plan likely means that the EG will remain high for the lifetime
of the plan.”173 The predictability of this threshold directly responds to the
plurality in Vieth, which, in rejecting the Bandemer standards, emphasized
that district maps can appear problematic in certain elections as voters’
political affiliations change. In Whitford, however, plaintiffs considered
election data since 2011.174
Partisan gerrymandering is a bipartisan concern because it undermines
voters’ trust in the democratic process.175 Democracy functions when voters
choose their representatives, not when elected representatives choose their
voters by constructing gerrymandered districts.176 Determining justiciability
is the first step in remediating the harms caused by partisan gerrymandering
the burden to rebut the presumption by showing that either a legitimate state policy or political
geography caused the high efficiency gap. Id. at 854–55; see also Grofman, supra note 7.
169. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 851–53. The Wisconsin legislature rejected four
constitutionally valid plans for lack of partisan advantage. Id. at 892–95.
170. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419.
171. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 910; see also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)
(holding that plaintiffs can raise equal protection concerns when apportionment plans
“minimize or cancel out the voting strength” of racial minorities or political representation of
voters).
172. See Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 536. Both the efficiency gap and partisan
symmetry measure the effectiveness of a political party in translating statewide votes into
legislative seats. See Petry, supra note 36, at 4.
173. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d. at 860.
174. Id. at 902.
175. See Brief of Republican State Leadership Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellants at 19, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (Aug. 4, 2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL
3412005 (arguing that voters may prefer noncompetitive districts given that “the closer the
representative is to the voter ideologically, the more satisfied is the voter” (quoting THOMAS
L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD
FOR AMERICA 30 (2008))); Brief of Senators John McCain and Sheldon Whitehouse in Support
of Appellees at 2–3, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (Sept. 5, 2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017
WL 4311105.
176. Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J.
1808, 1817 (2012) (describing this “legislative conflict of interest” as “legislators drawing
district lines that they ultimately have to run in”).
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as courts must evaluate justiciability before determining the merits of a
case.177
On October 3, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Gill v.
Whitford.178 If the Court vacates the district court decision and refuses to
articulate a manageable standard to adjudicate challenges of unconstitutional
partisan gerrymanders, then state legislatures might continue to determine the
composition of the House of Representatives once every ten years, regardless
of voters’ changing preferences. Results from the 2018 midterm elections
will dictate the composition of the state legislatures that will create the district
maps after the 2020 census.
In oral argument for Whitford, Justice Breyer, arguably intending to sway
Justice Kennedy, articulated the process by which a judge could adjudicate
partisan gerrymandering claims.179 First, the judge would inquire whether
there was single-party control of redistricting.180 If a commission, court, or
divided legislature developed the redistricting plan, then the judge would end
the inquiry.181 If, however, a single political party controlled districting, then
the judge would inquire whether there was partisan symmetry.182 Next, the
judge would analyze whether partisan symmetry would persist across
elections.183 If the judge found that the redistricting plan meets each criterion
and the legislature lacks a justification for the plan’s partisan effects, then the
court could declare the plan an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.184
Two months after oral arguments in Whitford, the Supreme Court added to
its merits docket Benisek v. Lamone185: a challenge of Maryland’s 2011
cracking of the state’s sixth congressional district.186 In Benisek, the
plaintiffs—registered Republican voters and supporters—alleged that the
Democratic-controlled state legislature violated their First Amendment
representational and associational rights by cracking the Sixth Congressional
District—flipping it from Republican to Democrat—based on citizens’
voting histories and party registration.187 The three-judge district court not
only held that plaintiffs stated a justiciable claim and denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss but also articulated a standard for justiciability of partisan
gerrymandering claims under the First Amendment.
177. Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 806 (D. Md.), hearing granted, 138 S. Ct.
50 (2017) (No. 17-333).
178. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 1.
179. Id. at 11–13.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Partisan symmetry occurs when a political party received a majority of state
legislative or congressional seats in an election with only 48 percent of the vote or when a
district plan has a high efficiency gap. See Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 536 (defining
“partisan bias as the deviation from partisan symmetry”).
183. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 910 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137
S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161).
184. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 11–13.
185. 266 F. Supp. 3d 799 (D. Md.), hearing granted, 138 S. Ct. 50 (2017) (No. 14-990).
186. Id. at 801.
187. Second Amended Complaint at 3, 6–7, Benisek, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799 (No. 13-cv3233).
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Under the new standard, plaintiffs must first establish that the drafters
intended to dilute votes and retaliate based on citizens’ voting history or
political association.188 Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate how the district
plan diluted votes of targeted citizens.189 Third, plaintiffs must show that the
vote dilution would not have occurred but for the drafters’ retaliatory
intent.190 If plaintiffs satisfy these elements, then they have established a
First Amendment claim and an Article I, Section 2 claim unless the state
shows that its district plan “was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest.”191 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court will determine
whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case as well consider the case’s merits.
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Whitford and Benisek may not only define
how much partisan advantage is constitutional. These decisions may also
have long-term effects on both the partisan balance in the House of
Representatives and state legislatures and, because many courts have stayed
proceedings pending the outcome in Whitford, the future of redistricting
litigation.192
3. Effects of This Approach
Wisconsin’s attorney general, Brad Schimel, said that the Court’s adoption
of plaintiffs’ constitutional test to determine unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering in Whitford would “invalidate a third of the legislative maps
drawn in the past 45 years.”193 This approach lacks limitations to prevent
every district map from being subject to litigation and shifts the responsibility
of implementing appropriately partisan districting plans from elected
representatives to unelected federal judges. Invalidating a third of legislative
and congressional district maps contradicts the caution that the judiciary
should exercise before invalidating district plans enacted by elected
representatives.194 Furthermore, if a party appealed the judgment of the
panel, the Supreme Court would have to decide the case on the merits.195

188. Benisek, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 802.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 595–96 (D. Md. 2016)). In
other words, plaintiffs must allege “intent, injury, and causation.” Id. (quoting Shapiro, 203 F.
Supp. 3d at 596–97).
191. Id. (quoting Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 597).
192. See Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 17A745, 2018 WL 472142 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2018)
(mem.) (granting application to stay order of the Middle District of North Carolina, which
ordered the state legislature to create revised congressional district plans by January 24, 2018,
after finding North Carolina’s congressional maps to be unconstitutional partisan
gerrymanders violating the Equal Protection Clause); Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV1026, 2018 WL 341658, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2018); see also Li et al., supra note 6.
193. Kendall & Bravin, supra note 28. But see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
30, at 52 (noting that Mr. Smith, counsel for the appellees, stated that the one-third estimate
ignores that commissions or courts drew many of those maps, which removes them from
invalidation).
194. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 52.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012).
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This approach would threaten the integrity of the Supreme Court through the
Court’s continuous political determinations.196
C. Revising the Judiciary’s Role in Redistricting
Neither position presented—complete judicial removal or complete
judicial involvement—mitigates the harms of partisan gerrymandering.
Rather, the adoption of either position would risk harm to voters’
representational rights and judicial integrity. Either state legislatures would
create and implement redistricting plans without judicial scrutiny or the
judiciary would redraw up to one-third of existing district plans, thereby
involving itself in the political process by overturning plans enacted by
elected representatives. To address partisan gerrymandering, the judiciary is
not required to choose one position over the other; it could create independent
solutions with respect to drawing electoral districts and adjudicating
redistricting claims.
While advocates for upholding partisan gerrymandering as a political
question argue that a judicially manageable standard does not yet exist, those
who advocate for the Supreme Court to adjudicate these claims disagree upon
the source—the First or Fourteenth Amendment—and the standard by which
to measure partisan fairness. For example, although Justice Antonin Scalia
dismissed partisan symmetry as neither judicially manageable nor protected
by the Equal Protection Clause, courts can still consider a state’s legislative
seats-to-votes ratio to find that disproportional representation constitutes
discriminatory effect.197
Under the efficiency gap or a number-based threshold, the state legislature
can articulate legitimate deviations that threaten the legitimacy of the court’s
determination. However, the Supreme Court constitutionalized similar
political determinations by creating the one-person, one-vote requirement.
Even if the state can articulate legitimate deviations from a numbers-based
threshold, the Supreme Court has not yet articulated the “legitimate state
prerogatives and neutral factors” implicated in redistricting.198 Rather, the
Court has held that unconstitutional gerrymandering requires more than
finding the application of political classifications and that the burden rests on
defendants to articulate legitimate objectives.199
In Whitford, the three-judge district court declared Act 43 unconstitutional
because the plan’s partisan advantage made it impossible for Democrats to
win the state assembly.200 Yet regardless of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Whitford, the Democratic Party could shift its attention to winning elections
for the governorship and state senate to eliminate state government trifectas,
196. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 30, at 36–38 (noting that Chief Justice
Roberts stated that the Court “will have to decide in every case whether the Democrats win or
the Republicans win”).
197. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 906 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137
S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 16-1161).
198. Id. at 911.
199. Id.; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 843.
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thereby creating political competition which would frustrate the state
legislature’s ability to pass district plans with high partisan advantage.201
III. WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE ON JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT
As discussed in Part II, neither total judicial removal nor judicial
involvement provide practical solutions to preventing partisan
gerrymandering. Regardless of the Supreme Court’s eventual decision in
Whitford, federal district courts should not develop district plans. There are
three avenues of reform: (1) the Supreme Court, (2) Congress, and (3) direct
legislation by voter initiative or referendum.202 Even if the Supreme Court
adopts the plaintiffs’ argument in Whitford, the Court is unlikely to remove
the federal judiciary’s authority to develop redistricting plans. In addition,
Congress is unlikely to use its constitutional authority under the Elections
Clause to constrain gerrymandering based on the political implications of
redistricting reform.203 States that permit direct legislation—voter initiatives
and referendums—however, present viable solutions to limit the conflict of
interest present in legislative redistricting—that representatives draw the
districts in which they campaign.204
State constitutions determine whether the legislature, judiciary, or an
independent commission develops congressional and state legislative
redistricting plans.205 The majority of state constitutions designate districting
authority for state legislative and congressional districts to the state
legislature.206 However, in response to heightened partisan gerrymanders,

201. Greenfield, supra note 7; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text. In addition,
state supreme courts could find that district maps containing a certain level of partisan
advantage violate the state’s constitution. See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Pa. Gen.
Assembly, No. 159 MM 2017, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 22, 2018) (per curiam) (declaring
Pennsylvania’s Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011 a partisan gerrymander that “clearly,
plainly, and palpably violates” the state’s constitution).
202. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2660
(2015) (explaining the difference between initiatives and referendums). Initiatives are
petitions proposing statutes or constitutional amendments to adopt or reject by voters. Id.
Referendums, however, are petitions for voters to approve or disapprove legislative action. Id.
Initiatives, unlike referendums, “operate[] entirely outside the States’ representative
assemblies.” Id.
203. Herbert & Jenkins, supra note 143, at 555.
204. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Arizona’s constitution gives voters
lawmaking power, including initiative and referendum, which enabled voters to enact the
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. Michael Woods, Note, Gerrymandering
(Almost) Gone Wild: How the Supreme Court Saved Independent Redistricting Reform, 68
FLA. L. REV. 1509, 1510, 1515 (2016) (noting that in 2000, Arizona voters passed a ballot
initiative that amended the state constitution to create standards to guide the Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission); see also Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.
Ct. at 2659.
205. Cain, supra note 176, at 1812; Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and Congressional
Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Apr. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Who Draws the Maps?],
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/who-draws-maps-states-redrawing-congressionaland-state-district-lines [https://perma.cc/FV5Z-39VF].
206. Who Draws the Maps?, supra note 205.
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several states have enacted redistricting reforms.207 While several states,
including Florida, passed strict redistricting guidelines to limit legislative
gerrymandering, other states, such as California and Arizona, removed the
legislature’s power to redistrict by enacting redistricting commissions.208
A redistricting commission is a body, apart from the state legislature,
designated to draw electoral district lines.209 Separate from the state
legislature, many states have proposed nonpartisan, bipartisan, or
independent redistricting commissions. On the one hand, in nonpartisan
commissions, the commission’s membership is either not specified or is
reserved, in part, for political independents.210 In bipartisan commissions,
on the other hand, the commission reserves the majority of membership for
members of the state’s two major political parties.211 In independent
commissions, members enact district plans without legislative approval and
cannot be either legislators or current public officials.212
In states that adopted redistricting commissions, federal district courts
retain authority to create a district plan if the commission fails to adopt a
constitutionally valid plan before the state’s redistricting deadline. Although
the court remains involved in the redistricting process, the use of
commissions to draft electoral maps limits partisan bias—eliminating the
legislative conflict of interest because members from the two major political
parties and a minority party compromise in drawing district lines.213
Furthermore, if the district court intervenes in the districting process, the
court remedies the commission’s violations by following state redistricting
policy and constitutional and statutory guidelines while retaining as much of
the commission’s districting plan as possible.214 Given that commissions
enact less partisan plans, there is a lower risk that the court in remedying the
commission’s violations will create a partisan gerrymander.215
207. Woods, supra note 204, at 1510. Elements of redistricting reform include “greater
transparency, options for third-party map submissions, citizen approval through direct
democracy, careful vetting for conflict of interest, [and] partisan and racial balance.” Cain,
supra note 176, at 1812.
208. Woods, supra note 204, at 1510–11; see also Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135
S. Ct. at 2658. In Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court upheld Arizona’s
constitutional grant of lawmaking power to the electorate in addition to the legislature. Ariz.
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2659. California’s independent commission
consists of fourteen members: three Democrats, three Republicans, and two third-party voters
chosen from applicants for the commission, who together choose six additional members. See
Catanese, supra note 38, at 343–44; see also Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at
2659.
209. Who Draws the Maps?, supra note 205.
210. Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming
the Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 999, 1058
(2013) (noting that in Iowa, a nonpartisan government agency redistricts).
211. See Cain, supra note 176, at 1814.
212. Id. at 1817.
213. Id. at 1843 (noting that an independent citizen commission “does not try to replace
politics” but rather “aspires to improve it enough to prevent substantial and widely perceived
unfairness”).
214. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2659 (2015).
215. See Cain, supra note 176, at 1842–43.
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Independent redistricting commissions—enacted through state voter
initiatives—should replace the federal court’s authority to develop
redistricting plans because state voter initiatives give voters lawmaking
power. Moreover, legislators can partake in choosing commissioners and can
provide them with political authority that the judiciary lacks. At the same
time, the structure of the commission prohibits legislators and candidates
from drawing district lines.216 Independent-commission membership also
prohibits commissioners from running for office in districts they drew for one
year after redistricting, thus restricting potential conflict of interests.217 For
example, some states, including Arizona and California, prohibit legislative
staff from joining the redistricting commission, while Idaho and Washington
prohibit membership by lobbyists.218
Independent redistricting commissions draw electoral lines in thirteen
states.219 Arizona’s independent redistricting commission (AIRC) and
California’s redistricting commission (CRC) are the most well-known
alternatives to legislative redistricting.220 Under the Arizona State
Constitution, the state commission on appellate court appointments
establishes a pool of citizen-candidates for the independent redistricting
commission with ten nominees each registered with the largest political
parties and five registered minority voters.221 From the pool of twenty-five,
legislative party officials appoint four AIRC members, who, in turn, appoint
the fifth member—the chair.222
In California, however, the state auditor forms a pool of citizens—based
on their analytical skills, impartiality, “and a demonstrated appreciation for
California’s diverse demographics and geography”—from which legislative
officials can strike citizens.223 Then, the auditor randomly selects eight
members: three Democrats, three Republicans, and two minority-party or
no-affiliation members.224 The eight commissioners then choose the
remaining six members: two Democrats, two Republicans, and two minorityparty or no-affiliation members.225 The CRC model is less partisan than the
216. Who Draws the Maps?, supra note 205.
217. Id.
218. See infra notes 220–25 and accompanying text.
219. Gaughan, supra note 210, at 1058 (noting that Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, New Jersey, and Washington have independent commissions for congressional and
state legislative redistricting); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra
note 19, at 163–66 (noting that Alaska Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
have established independent commissions only for legislative redistricting).
220. See Cain, supra note 176, at 1812.
221. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, §§ 1(3)–(5). The highest-ranking officers and the minority
party leaders in the Arizona House of Representatives and Senate make appointments to the
commission from the pool of nominees. Id. § 1(6). Only two members can belong to the same
political party or reside in the same county. Id. § 1(3).
222. Id. § 1(8). The four commission members select the fifth member, the chair, who must
not be registered with a party that is already represented on the commission. Id.
223. Background on Commission, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION,
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission.html [https://perma.cc/5E9R-ZF6R] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2018); see also Cain, supra note 176, at 1818.
224. Background on Commission, supra note 223.
225. Id.
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AIRC model because the legislature cannot appoint members; it can only
strike candidates.
State voter initiatives and referendums are viable solutions for redistricting
reform because they stop the cycle of representatives elected through
gerrymandered district plans from electing new representatives to maintain a
political majority.226 Together, initiatives and referendums do not only adopt
legislation to limit partisan gerrymandering, they correct legislative
gerrymanders.227 In Whitford, Wisconsin voters lacked power to authorize
independent commissions to redistrict: only the state legislature could enact
that transition.228 Thus, in states such as Wisconsin, change in partisan
redistricting is unlikely to occur until voters can effect change through
initiatives.229
Although independent commissions provide broader political
representation, Professor Bruce Cain identified flaws in Arizona and
California’s redistricting commissions that retain partisan influence.230 First,
neither commission addresses the political influence of technical and legal
employees; the commission’s support staff could jeopardize the
commission’s bipartisanship because most redistricting consultants and
specialized lawyers assist a political party.231 Second, state legislatures fund
the commission before and after the plan’s enactment and can withdraw
funding if displeased with the plan’s partisan effects.232 Third, in Arizona,
the legislature has authority to “remove AIRC members for ‘gross
misconduct.’”233 Thus, in states where the legislature can interfere with the
commission and the controlling party disagrees with the commission’s plan,
courts must discern whether the legislature’s interference was lawful.
Although Professor Cain identified flaws in the most prominent
commissions, amendments to initiatives governing or forming the
commissions can resolve each conflict.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the Court’s decisions in Whitford and Benisek, the
Supreme Court can largely avoid this political thicket. State voter initiatives
can transfer federal courts’ authority to develop redistricting plans to
independent redistricting commissions. Although independent commissions
226. Supra note 176 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
228. Greenfield, supra note 7.
229. Id.
230. See Cain, supra note 176, at 1834–35.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1835 (“The total budget for Arizona’s 2001 Independent Redistricting
Commission was $9,544,100, 63% of which was spent after 2002.”).
233. Id. at 1836. The Governor of Arizona’s attempt to remove the Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission’s independent chair led to a Supreme Court ruling. See generally
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). The
Arizona Constitution allows the governor, with concurrence by two-thirds of the Senate, to
remove a member of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission for “substantial
neglect of duty, gross misconduct in office, or inability to discharge the duties of office.” ARIZ.
CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(10).
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have not “lessened the odds of redistricting-related litigation,” they limit the
legislative conflict of interest in redistricting that causes partisan advantage
and remove opportunities for federal courts to create district maps that
perpetuate political bias.234 If independent redistricting commissions create
more politically fair district plans that retain competitive districts, then voter
turnout will increase: individual voters will believe that they can translate
their votes into legislative seats. Increased voter turnout benefits democracy
because voters use their ballot power to hold representatives accountable, as
opposed to gerrymandered districts that entrench a political party’s majority
for the duration of the plan.
If the Supreme Court articulates a standard for lower courts to adjudicate
partisan gerrymandering claims, then district courts could order numerous
state legislatures to redraw district plans with less partisan advantage.
Independent redistricting commissions could develop several state legislative
and congressional district plans if the state’s legislature does not enact a
constitutional plan before the state’s redistricting deadline. Overall, this shift
would be a positive one because independent commissions achieve the
benefits of the judiciary developing district plans in the legislature’s stead,
while avoiding its shortcomings—thus making their authority to redistrict in
such circumstances a much more welcome obligation.

234. Cain, supra note 176, at 1812.

